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MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY: CITY OF
LAFAYETTE V. LOUISIANA POWER
& LIGHT CO.
The extent to which state laws or the action of state officials can
immunize conduct which would otherwise violate the federal anti-
trust laws is unclear.' The constitutional primacy of federal over
state law2 commands that federal antitrust laws dominate whenever
in conflict with state law or policy. The principles of federalism, on
the other hand, dictate that states should be able to regulate their own
economies.3 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.4 the
1. See generall, VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION vol. 16, § 46.03 (1978); Donnem, FederalAntitrust Law Ver-
sus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970); Jacobs,
State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 221, 231-57
(1975); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the FederalAnti-
trust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974); Saveri, The Applicability of the Antitrust
Laws to Public Bodies, 4 U.S.F. L. REV. 217 (1970); Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71 (1974);
Teply, Antitrust ImmunifY of State and Local Governmental Action, 48 TUL. L. REV.
272 (1974).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. Traditionally, states have enjoyed broad authority to legislate for the health,
safety and general welfare of their citizens, limited only by constitutional and statu-
tory restraints. The fundamental rationale for exempting state conduct from federal
antitrust scrutiny is a concern for the impact of a contrary policy on federalism inter-
ests. States often enact regulatory programs, such as zoning, restrictive franchise li-
censing and blue laws, which interfere with free competition. Without such an
exemption, much of this regulation would be exposed to federal antitrust liability,
threatening the states' long-recognized power to regulate the commercial affairs of
their citizens. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("In a dual system of
government. . . the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority .... "). See generally Donnem, FederalAntitrust Law
Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 951 (1970);
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71, 75-77 (1974).
Different considerations arise in cases alleging that federal action, rather than state
action, is anticompetitive. Congress may change or limit its own policies without rais-
ing the federalism issue. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 982 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). In federal regulatory cases, the issue is one of primary jurisdiction and
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Supreme Court concluded that municipal regulatory activities are not
always immune from the application of federal antitrust laws.5
Plaintiffs were two municipal corporations6 which owned and op-
erated electric utility systems. They brought suit alleging that Louisi-
ana Power & Light Company (LP&L)7 and three private electric
utilities had violated federal antitrust laws.8 LP&L counterclaimed,
seeking damages and injunctive relief for federal antitrust offenses
which plaintiffs had allegedly committed. The counterclaim charged
that the cities had entered into contracts in restraint of trade, con-
ducted vexatious litigations, and imposed an illegal tying arrange-
ment on their customers.9
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim. They contended that,
as subdivisions of the state of Louisiana, the state action doctrine of
deference to agency findings. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973) (FPC).
4. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
5. Before Lafayette, several courts debated whether to grant municipalities immu-
nity from the federal antitrust laws. Each undertook a different analysis to resolve the
question. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1281 (3d Cir. 1975) (munici-
palities liable for boycott allegedly caused by cities' refusal to sell plaintiff's products
in municipal stadium because state legislature did not intend to compel or even per-
mit a boycott); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1975) (anti-
trust challenge to city council's rate making practices dismissed because state
legislature had expressly delegated rate making authority to municipalities); Conti-
nental Bus System, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 362-63 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(cities are immune from antitrust liability for granting themselves exclusive franchise
to conduct airport bus service because they are public instrumentalities); Murdock v.
City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1091-92 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (city immune from
antitrust liability for participating in exclusive contract to rent city auditorium be-
cause power had been specifically delegated to city by state legislature).
6. City of Lafayette and City of Plaquemine are both organized under the laws of
the State of Louisiana. See LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 7(a) (effective Jan. 1, 1975); LA.
CONsT. art. XIV, § 40(a) (1921) (effective before Jan. 1, 1975); See generaly LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33:361, :506, :621 (West 1950).
Louisiana law grants cities the power to own and operate electric utility systems
both within and beyond their city limits. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1326, :4162,
:4163 (West 1950).
7. Defendant, Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L), is an investor-owned
electric service utility with which the cities compete in areas beyond their city limits.
8. Plaintiffs' complaint charged that defendants conspired to restrain trade and
attempted to monopolize and have monopolized the generation, transmission and sale
of electric power in Louisiana. This complaint was not involved on appeal. 435 U.S.
at 392-95.
9. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14 (1976). See also note 6 and
accompanying text supra.
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Parker r. Brown' ° rendered federal antitrust laws inapplicable to
them. The district court reluctantly agreed."' The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed,' 2 rejecting the contention that municipali-
ties are always exempt from federal antitrust laws.' 3 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court affirmed.' 4 A majority of the Court concluded
that, in enacting the trade regulation statutes, Congress did not in-
tend to exclude local governments from antitrust liability. 5 Five
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The state action doctrine applies when litigants challenge
a state policy under federal antitrust laws. Anticompetitive state action appears in
various forms. In particular, courts have examined the Parker doctrine's application
to state regulatory programs, Macom Prods. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 359 F. Supp. 973
(CD Cal 1973); Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D.
Ga. 1969) (state creation of statutory torts or unfair competition); Murdock v. City of
Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (nonregulatory anticompetitive ac-
tion by state officials).
1I. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 433 (5th
Cir, 1976). Unwilling to exempt an enterprise which was "clearly a business activity"
from the antitrust laws, the district court held that plaintiffs' status as cities was suffi-
cient to bring all their conduct within the state action exemption. Accord, New Mex-
ico v American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (antitrust laws do not
apply to a state and its political subdivisions that allegedly conspired as consumers of
asphalt to fix prices and eliminate competition); Saenz v. University Interscholastic
League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1973) (state agency and state official acting
within the scope of their authority are not subject to requirements of federal antitrust
laws).
12. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at 434-35. The Fifth Circuit found that a "subordinate state governmental
body was not ipsofacto exempt from the operation of federal antitrust laws." Id.
Rather, the district court must examine whether the anticompetitive restraint is the
type of activity that the legislature intended the governmental body perform. Accord,
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
14 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
15. Id. at 418. Part I, written by Justice Brennan, represents the opinion of the
Court. (Burger, C.J., and Marshall, Powell and Stevens, J.J., joined in Part I). In Part
1, the Court held that the term "person" or "persons" as defined in the federal anti-
trust laws included cities as municipal utility operators, whether suing as plaintiffs or
being sued as defendants. Furthermore, the court asserted that based on public pol-
icy, there was no implied exclusion of cities as municipal utility operators from cover-
age as "persons" under the antitrust laws.
The antitrust statutes repeatedly use the word "person" or "persons." See 15
U.S C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 7. 8. 15 (1976). Nowhere, however, do the antitrust laws mention the
state as within the scope of "person." Several courts have reasoned that the terms
"person" or "persons" included public bodies when suing as plaintiffs. See Georgia
v. Evans. 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (the words "any person" in Section 7 of the Sherman
Act included states, therefore, the State of Georgia was permitted to bring an action
in its own name charging injury from a combination to fix prices and suppress compe-
tition in the market for asphalt); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of At-
lanta. 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of Section
1980]
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members of the Court, although unable to concur on an opinion,
agreed that the state action exemption did not automatically exempt
cities from the operation of federal antitrust laws.' 6
By enacting federal prohibitions against unreasonable restraints of
trade and monopolization,' 7 unlawful price discrimination,'" unfair
trade practices' 9 and other anti-competitive conduct,20 Congress cre-
8 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, the City of Atlanta could maintain a treble damage
action). Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (federal government
not recognized as a person entitled to sue under the Sherman Act). But ef. Lowen-
stein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D. S.C. 1895) (a state is not "a person" subject to
liability under the Sherman Act. Therefore, the Act did not preclude a state from
declaring itself a monopoly in the purchase and sale of liquor).
A partial answer to this dilemma came in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In
Parker, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act, in view of its language and
legislative history, "must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state
action." Id. at 352. This broad language provided the foundation for lower court
development of a disparate state immunity doctrine. Some courts accorded full anti-
trust immunity for all anticompetitive activity in which a state participated. Other
courts cautioned that state involvement only begins the inquiry. See generally cases
cited note 39 and accompanying text infra.
The Lafayette court addressed the issue of whether Congress did or did not intend
to subject local governments to the antitrust laws--even though it was not presented
by the parties or facts of the case-to resolve the historical confusion over the exact
scope of "person" or "persons" as used in the antitrust laws. Compare Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Sherman Act forbids only those trade re-
straints and monopolizations which are created or attempted by individuals or corpo-
rations or combinations of individuals or corporations) and New Mexico v. American
Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1974) (Sherman Act does not apply to
states regardless of the proprietary nature of the government activity in question) with
Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1294
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (court cautioned that state involve-
ment "only begins the analysis, for it is not every governmental act that points a path
to an antitrust shelter.") and Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 163 (1942) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (Court's recognition that a state is a "person" entitled to sue as a plaintiff
for injuries to its proprietary interests logically permits a state to be sued as a defend-
ant). See generally.Slater, Antitrust and Government Action." A Formulafor Narrowing
Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71, 83-84 (1974); Tepley, Antitrust Immunity of
State andLocal Governmental~ction, 48 TUL. L. REV. 272, 277 (1974); White, Partici-
pant Governmental Action Immunityfrom the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction, 50 Tax.
L. REv. 474, 482 (1972).
16. 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978).
17. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
18. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21a
(1976).
19. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4-58 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
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ated a federal policy of competition for interstate commerce. 2' Con-
gress did not, however, explicitly deal with the issue of conflict
between federal antitrust policy and state regulatory action.22 The
courts, vested with broad discretion in construing the antitrust stat-
utes, 23 have given competition precedence and have repeatedly held
that immunity from the antitrust laws cannot be lightly implied.24 In
21, The basic judicial view as to the scope and purpose of the federal antitrust
laws was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
Id. at 4-5. See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
406 (1978) ("In enacting the Sherman Act ... Congress mandated competition as the
polestar by which all must be guided in ordering their business affairs."); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general, and the
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.").
22. The constitutional implications of the antitrust law/state action conflict stem
from the general concepts of federalism, pre-emption and two specific limits on fed-
eral power. Under the Tenth Amendment, states may regulate local markets and
attend to local economic problems "save only as Congress may constitutionally sub-
tract from their authority." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). See also
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment was enacted "to
allay fears . . that the states might not be able to exercise their fully reserved pow-
ers."). The Federalist Nos. 45, 46 (J. Madison); Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1976); Tepley,
Antitrust Immunity of State and Local GovernmentalAction, 48 TUL. L. REv. 272, 272
n3 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits brought in federal court against
an unconsenting state. See Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910 (C.C.D. S.C. 1895)
(proceeding under Sherman Act against state as holder of monopoly on sale of liquor
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). See also note 57 and accompanying text infra.
23. The generality of the statutory language embodied in the antitrust laws vests
courts with a wide range of discretion in construing their statutory provisions and in
molding their remedies. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
348 (D. Mass. 1953), aif'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ("In the antitrust field the courts have
been accorded by common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of
enacted law."). See generally J. VAN CISE, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (3d ed.
1975).
24. California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962) reprinted in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963). Accord, City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 (1978); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); United States v. Nat'l Assoc. of Securi-
ties Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1974).
Commentators examining Congressional deliberations prior to the Sherman Act's
1980]
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Parker v. Brown, 5 however, the Supreme Court concluded that Con-
gress did not intend to apply the federal antitrust laws to conduct
sanctioned by state governments.
2 6
In Parker, plaintiff questioned the validity of California's collabo-
rative raisin marketing program27 under the Sherman Act.28 Assum-
ing that the program would violate the Act if implemented by private
persons,2 9 the Court nevertheless rejected the Sherman Act chal-
lenge.3" Chief Justice Stone announced the general rule that re-
straints of trade resulting from valid governmental action cannot give
rise to private antitrust liability.3 ' His opinion cautioned, however,
enactment have generally concluded that the Act's legislative history lends little
assistance in resolving whether Congress intended the Act to apply to states and their
political subdivisions. See Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: 4 Formula for
Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 83-87 (1974); Tepley, ntitrust
Immuni
, 
of State and Local GovernmentalAction, 48 TUL. L. REv. 272, 277 & n.39
(1974); White, Particpant Governmental Immunity from the Antitrust Laws. Fact or
Fiction, 50 TEx. L. REv. 474, 482 & n.6 (1972).
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. Id. at 350-52.
27. The California Agricultural Prorate Act authorized the state director of agri-
culture and a publicly appointed commission to adopt marketing programs regulating
the production and sale of agricultural products. 317 U.S. at 346-47. The overriding
purpose of the raisin marketing program was to restrict competition among growers,
maintain wholesale prices and guard against the harmful effects of excess supply. Id.
at 346, 355.
28. Parker is better known for its interpretation of the commerce clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8(3). The Court sustained the validity of the program under the com-
merce clause on grounds that the state program only applied to intrastate transac-
tions. Furthermore, the Court found that regulation of the raisin industry was a local
concern that, absent preemptive federal legislation, was subject to state supervision.
317 U.S. at 360-61, 368. See generally Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: 4
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71, 72 n.5 (1974); 41
MicH. L. REv. 968(1943); 27 MINN. L. REv. 468 (1943).
29. 317 U.S. at 350.
30. Id. at 350-52. The Supreme Court found no conflict between the California
raisin marketing program and the Sherman Act, basing its conclusion on two
grounds. First, the Court determined the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to
the states or to official actions taken by states in their sovereign capacities. Id. at 350-
51. See also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965) (coal
mining company not entitled to damages under Sherman Act for injuries suffered
from actions of public official); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (state system of
licensing harbor pilots not a Sherman Act violation); note 15 supra. Second, the
Court found that the program did not operate through combinations, conspiracies or
agreements among individuals, but by force of valid state law. 317 U.S. at 350.
31. 317 U.S. at 350-52.
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that the government action exemption created 32 was neither all-inclu-
sive nor restricted to state conduct.33
Thirty-two years after Parker, the Supreme Court reexamined the
precise scope and meaning of the state action exemption.34 In Gold-
32 The fundamental elements of the Parker holding antedated the decision by
some 50 years. In Olsen v. Smith, 195 US. 332 (1904), for example, the Court upheld
a state statute limiting pilotage services to licensed pilots. Defendants argued the li-
censed pilot association constituted a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. The
Court was unpersuaded: -[l]f the State has the power to regulate [pilots]. . . it must
follow that no monopoly or combination can arise from the fact that the duly author-
ized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them
by law." Id. at 345. See also Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D. S.C. 1895)
(validity of state liquor monopoly sustained against a Sherman Act challenge).
33, 317 U.S. at 351-52. The Chief Justice stated that the "case involved no ques-
tion of the state or its municipality participating in a private agreement to restrain
trade." id. This language suggested first, that the Parker Court viewed municipali-
ties as agents of the state entitled to the same antitrust protection as states. Second,
the Court's statement indicated it did not intend the state action exemption to go so
far as to shield a state or city acting as a co-conspirator in an agreement to restrain
trade.
34. Following Parker, the Supreme Court consistently declined to review cases in
which the state action issue was contested. E.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port. Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). The Court did
refer to Parker in Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)
(statutory resale price maintenance scheme requiring non-signers of the price mainte-
nance contracts to charge the same minimum price as that charged by signers of the
contract held unenforceable under the Sherman Act notwithstanding the element of
state compulsion); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961) (Sherman Act cannot interfere with the individual's right to solicit
government action or communicate with government officials, even if the requested
action has an anticompetitive purpose); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (rejected a defense of compliance by a foreign
sovereign, supported by analogy to Parker, because there was no indication that the
foreign government required, or even approved, the anticompetitive conduct in ques-
tion) None of these cases, however, involved a direct examination of the Parker
doctrine.
Lower federal courts, left without resolution of the precise scope of the state action
exemption, rendered a series of inconsistent and often contradictory opinions. Com-
pare Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959)
(exemption inappropriate where state control was limited to a statute authorizing the
local board of trade to make reasonable rules and regulations for sale and handling of
leaf tobacco) with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
aft'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (immunity claim by a
private, non-profit insurance company rejected, even though its business activities
were regulated by state, because (1) it was "the creature of individuals-not the
state," and (2) it had "not been extended valid governmental authority to engage in
1980]
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farb v. Virginia State Bar,35 the Court faced a Sherman Act challenge
to minimum fee schedules published and enforced by a state bar as-
sociation. Traditionally, the bar has been a regulated profession and
the state bar was a state agency by law for some purposes.3 6 Yet the
Court unanimously concluded that the federal antitrust laws applied
because the state did not command the establishment of minimum
fees.3 7 The Court reasoned that the state bar's participation in price
monopolistic practices.") and Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Corp., 394 F.2d
672, 675 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968) ("it is settled that neither
the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act was intended to authorize restraint of govern-
mental action.").
Several courts accorded full antitrust immunity to all public instrumentalities re-
gardless of their functions. Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp.
299, 303 (D. Mass.), af'd, 242 F.2d 758 (Ist Cir. 1957) (Sherman Act does not apply to
state activities or to activities of its officers directed by the state legislature); Continen-
tal Bus Systems, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (estab-
lishment of a municipal airport bus service by two cities and their refusal to allow a
private bus line to enter into competition with that service was immune from Sher-
man Act).
Other decisions focused on the degree of state control over and participation in the
defendants' activities before extending immunity. Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc.
v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (3d Cir. 1971) (mandatory filing program of
Virgin Islands Alcoholic Beverages Fair Trade Law did not involve governmental
action sufficient to warrant protection of Parker); Washington Gas & Light Co. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971) (promotional plans by
state regulated electric utility exempt from application of antitrust laws because plans
were always under active supervision of state commission); Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (state statute
did not protect actions of doctors in boycotting abortion clinic because defendant's
actions were not required by the state acting as sovereign). See general' Verkuil,
State Action Doctrine, Due Process and,4ntitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 328, 339-40, 340 n.66 (1975).
A number of cases examined the clarity of the state's legislative intent to undertake
the disputed program. Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d
1258, 1260 (6th Cir. 1974) (county air board's award of an exclusive contract to a
taxicab company to service the airport held immune from antitrust attack because
regulation of ground transportation is necessarily incident to statutorily granted right
to manage and operate airport facilities); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev.
Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 132, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (operation of bi-state public transpor-
tation held immune from federal antitrust laws because transit agency was a joint
instrumentality of two states authorized to enter field of public transportation). E.W.
Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 53, 55 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (Massachusetts Port Authority held to have acted as
agency of state pursuant to mandate imposed on it, and to have exercised a valid
governmental function in allowing only one fixed base operation at airport).
35. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
36. Id. at 789-90.
37. Id. at 790. The Virginia State Legislature had empowered the State Supreme
[Vol. 18:265
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fixing failed to satisfy "the threshold inquiry" under Parker-
"whether the activity is required by the state acting as sovereign."38
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,39 a sharply divided Court denied
antitrust immunity for the anticompetitive conduct of a private utility
even though such immunity was "required" by the state sovereign.40
The utility operated a free light bulb exchange service4 ' as part of
tariffs filed with the state power commission.4" The Court looked be-
yond this government approval and concluded that there was no un-
fairness in holding the utility liable for an activity it initiated.43
Court to regulate the practice of law and had assigned the State Bar a role in that
regulation as an administrative agency of the Supreme Court. VA. CODE § 54-48, 54-
59 (1978). The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, had taken no action requiring
the use of and adherence to minimum fee schedules. 421 U.S. at 790. Furthermore,
no Virginia statute referred to the establishment of lawyers' fees. Id. But see Lathrop
v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 825 (1961) (because attorneys are officers of the court,
regulation of their conduct is a power inherent in the judiciary, regardless of legisla-
tive delegation).
38. 421 U.S. at 790. See also Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d
1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1976) (antitrust immunity denied where no state action compelled
insurance company to exclude chiropractor from their insurance plans). Cf. City of
Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n., 562 F.2d 280, 284 (4th Cir. 1977) (command from
lesser state body than state legislature does not satisfy conditions for invocation of
state action doctrine). See general Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1976); 7 Loy. U. OF CHI.
L.J. 254, 272 (1976).
39 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
40. Id. at 582-85. The plurality found Parker did not control because the case
presented no question of the legality of any acts of the state, its officers or agents. Id.
at 591-92 (Stevens, J., with Brennan, White and Marshall, J.J., concurring). Chief
Justice Burger, author of the Goldfarb opinion, disagreed, stating that the court
should focus on the nature of the challenged activity rather than the identity of the
parties. Id. at 603-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The boldest approach was taken by
Justice Blackmun. He advocated a preemption analysis, giving federal courts signifi-
cant discretion to override state regulation whose justification was insufficient to war-
rant displacement of the antitrust laws. Id. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
result). See generaly Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Anaysis, 84 YALE L.J.
1164 (1975).
41. 428 U.S. at 582, 584 n.9. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6 (West
Supp. 1977).
42. 428 U.S. at 593-94. The Court also noted that although the state regulated the
distribution of light bulbs, it was not involved in the marketing of light bulbs. Id. at
584-85.
43. Id. at 596-97. In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1976), under facts extraordinarily similar to the situation in Cantor, the
Fifth Circuit denied antitrust immunity for Bell's tying of private branch exchanges to
general telephone service as part of a tariff structure. Id. at 423-24. The Court noted
that the state and municipal regulatory agencies had merely acquiesced in Bell's tar-
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Furthermore, the state had no "independent regulatory interest" in
the light bulb program which application of the antitrust laws might
frustrate.44
Two years later, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona41 clarified an idea
implicit in Parker, Goldfarb and Cantor: The extent to which the
federal antitrust laws apply to governmental action depends on the
nature of the government decision involved.46 The Court held that
the Parker doctrine barred claims against the Arizona State Bar
which regulated advertising for lawyers pursuant to a disciplinary
rule adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court.47 The Court empha-
sized that the state policy compelling the challenged activity was
clearly articulated as part of a comprehensive regulatory system and
actively supervised by the State Supreme Court.48
In Lafayette, the Court addressed the cognate problem of whether
the antitrust laws apply to municipalities which are parties in a con-
spiracy to restrain trade. The plurality stated that municipal actions
are immune from antitrust liability only when it can be shown "from
the authority given a governmental entity in a particular area, that
iffi. The tying arrangement, like the light bulb program in Cantor, was neither neces-
sary for effective state regulation of telephone service nor the result of a cohesive state
policy. Id.
44. 428 U.S. at 596-97. See Eliwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 496 F.
Supp. 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
45. 433 U.S. 350 (1978).
46. See 428 U.S. at 605; 421 U.S. at 788-89; 317 U.S. at 351-52.
47. Id. at 359-63. Although divided on other issues, the Justices completely
agreed on the applicability of the Parker doctrine to the case. The court distinguished
Cantor as involving claims against a private party in which the state acquiesced. The
claims in Bates, on the other hand, were directed against the Arizona Supreme Court
as the real party in interest. Furthermore, the State of Michigan had no regulatory
interest in the market for light bulbs whereas the State of Arizona had a well estab-
lished interest in lawyer advertising. Id. at 360-62. Goldfarb was distinguished be-
cause the Virginia Supreme Court rules did not require the use of minimum fee
schedules, whereas the Arizona Supreme Court rules clearly prohibited legal advertis-
ing. Id. at 359-60.
48. Id. at 359-63. In Mobilfone of N.E. Pa., Inc. v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 571
F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1978), the court stated:
[WMe perceive Cantor, Goldfarb and Bates to teach that in order for the Parker
rule to apply, the defendant must show that the state has an independent regula-
tory interest in the subject matter of the antitrust controversy; that there exists a
clear and affirmative articulation of the state's policy with regard to that interest;
and that the state supervision is active.
Id. at 144. See generally Note, Parker v. Brown Repisited: The State Action Doctrine
After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898 (1978).
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the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of."49
Justice Marshall, concurring, explained that state action involving
more anticompetitive restraint than necessary to effectuate govern-
mental purposes was inconsistent with the plurality's approach.50
The Chief Justice, also concurring in the result, believed that the ap-
propriate issue was whether the Sherman Act reached the proprietary
enterprises of municipalities.5 He concluded that the cities should
49. 435 U.S. at 415, quoting 532 F.2d 431, 434. The plurality, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell and Stevens, believed that the policy of preserving to the states the
traditional authority they exercised to regulate their economies did not require grant-
ing antitrust immunity to all actions of municipalities. A state's regulatory preroga-
tives can be protected by holding that antitrust laws do not apply to conduct
%contemplated" by the state legislature in its delegation of regulatory authority to a
political subdivision. Any other rule would require federal policy to yield to a variety
of local decisions that may have little to do with an articulable state policy and that
may be severely detrimental to the interests protected by federal law. In essence, the
Court determined that every act of a city is not necessary to the regulatory power of
the state. Cities may act in defiance of the state policy. When that happens no state
interest can be served by withholding application of the federal antitrust statutes. Id.
at 408-416. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 1977) (application
of Parker doctrine requires thoughtful analysis to ensure it is a bonafide state govern-
ment decision for which the antitrust exemption is sought). See generally Note, The
.4ntitrust Liabiliti, of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368
(1977); Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municpalities Exempt
from Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977).
50 435 U.S. at 417-18.
51. Id. at 418-19. The utility of distinguishing between governmental and propri-
etary activities has a long and colorful history. It has been discredited, National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); New
York v. United States. 326 U.S. 572, 580-84 (1946); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 183 (1936), resuscitated, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
854-55 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) and ignored, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d
431, 434 n.8 (1976); New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 371-72
(9th Cir. 1974); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 137
(8th Cir. 1970).
Most decisions examining municipal liability under the antitrust laws equate local
entities with the state and ignore the anticompetitive nature of the disputed activity.
See cases cited note 5 and accompanying text supra. A city, however, has two types
of power. It can exercise powers expressly delegated to it by state government. See
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-87 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251,
1253-54 (5th Cir. 1976). A city also can act in a proprietary, quasi-private manner for
its own benefit or the benefit of its citizens. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Pad-
dock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970);
City of Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 227-28, 83 S.W. 583, 584 (1904); Hicks v.
City of Monroe Util. Comm'n, 237 La. 847, 866, 112 So. 2d 635, 641 (1959).
Where a municipality acts in an essentially commercial capacity, immunizing the
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be treated in essentially the same manner as any private utility.5 2
Four justices dissented,53 arguing that Parker should control. 4 They
contended that cities are instrumentalities of the state, not private
persons, and that their actions are acts of government immune from
antitrust liability.
Lafayette demonstrates, perhaps more strikingly than any other
conduct from antitrust liability serves no rational policy objective. See Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Municoalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368,
386 (1977). Cf. Note, Antitrust Law and Municoal Corporations: Are Munico:alities
Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547,
1583-85 (criticizes governmental/proprietary distinction and suggests its abolish-
ment). The problem, however, is that in many situations the commercial activities of
a city also serve regulatory or governmental purposes. See, e.g., Ladue Local Lines,
Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (transit system monop-
oly).
52. 435 U.S. at 418-20. Chief Justice Burger concluded that the focus of the
Court's inquiry should be on the challenged activity rather than the identity of the
parties to the suit. The Chief Justice found that the cities were engaging in a business
activity in which a profit is realized and that the dispute involved was one among
competitors in the same market. Therefore, the test that must be satisfied, as enunci-
ated in Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, is whether the anticompetitive conduct is "re-
quired by the state acting as sovereign." Chief Justice Burger also suggested a
supplemental inquiry-determining whether the implied exemption was necessary to
make the regulatory act work, "and even then only to the minimum extent neces-
sary." Id. at 418-26.
53. Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 426. Jus-
tice Stewart's dissent asserted that both the plurality and the Chief Justice erred in
failing to recognize the distinction between "private activities authorized or regulated
by government on the one hand, and the actions of government itself on the other."
Id. at 428. Although Cantor and Goldfarb may be applied in determining whether
the state action exemption is to be extended to private activity, only Parker applies
when municipalities are involved. Id. at 431-32. "Municipal corporations are instru-
mentalities of the State for the convenient administration of government within their
limits." Id. at 429, quoting Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109
U.S. 285, 287 (1883). And the Cities should have enjoyed the antitrust exemption.
54. Justice Blackmun, agreeing with most of the Stewart dissent, wrote a short
dissenting opinion in which he criticized the "nonchalance" with which the Court
considered the question of the appropriate remedy. Id. at 441-43. See note 64 and
accompanying text infra.
55. Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates involved entities associated with the state for only
limited purposes. Municipalities, on the other hand, are subordinate government
bodies selected by the state to carry out governmental functions. The states must act
through agents, and states have delegated a significant portion of their regulatory
authority to municipal governments. See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U.S. 182, 185-87 (1923) (city could only acquire right to divert river by grant from
state); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976) (city
is creature of and subject to state will).
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case, the continuing tension between federalism and the national pol-
icy of fostering free competition. The Court's opinions convey the
unmistakable message that subordinate government units are not en-
titled to all of the deference that federalism demands for the state
itself. 6 Goldfarb and Cantor suggest that exemptions from antitrust
coverage should extend only to activities in which the state has
played a significant role as sovereign. Parker and Bates exemplify
judicial reluctance to impose federal regulations on sovereign states.
The Lafayette Court combines these impulses in reasoning that the
connection between a legislative grant of power and a city's use of
that ?ower may be too tenuous to always warrant antitrust immu-
nity.-
The plurality approach in Lafayette is useful but not dispositive.
State legislatures do not contemplate performance of a significant
portion of local government action. The lines between a state's com-
56. Both the plurality and the Chief Justice rely on the notion of federalism-the
distinction between the two opinions being the degree of deference to state activity
that federalism requires. The plurality concluded that Parker, as interpreted by Gold-
farb, Cantor and Bates, "exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act
of government by the State as sovereign, or by its subdivisions, pursuant to a state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 435 U.S.
at 413. Such a state policy exists so long as the state legislature contemplated the
alleged anticompetitive action. Such a finding is only the "threshold inquiry for the
Chief Justice. He would take the "additional step ... of determining whether the
implied exemption from federal law 'was necessary to make the regulatory Act work,
"and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."' " Id. at 425-26. Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion suggests that the Chief Justice's emphasis on scrutiny
of state regulatory policy may be little more than a detailed explanation of the plural-
ity opinion. He concluded that the plurality's "test ... relating to whether it is 'state
policy to displace competition,.'. , incorporates within it the core of the Chief Jus-
tice's concern." Id. at 417.
57 The Court's assumption of possible municipal liability finds support in several
differences between a state and its municipal subdivisions. See notes 49 and 51 and
accompanying text supra. See also Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118,
121-22 (1868).
The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit suits brought in federal
court against an unconsenting state by its own citizens and by citizens of other states.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-663 (1974). Courts have not extended the
amendment's protections to municipalities. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,
530 (1890). Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 196 1); N.
M Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 111. 1959). The
rationale for this view is that immunity only attaches to the state in its sovereign
capacity. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568,
579 (D.N.J. 1967) and municipalities are political corporations considered distinct
from the state as sovereign. Id. at 578-79.
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pulsion,58 approval,59 authorization6" and contemplation 6 1 of a par-
ticular municipal activity are often unclear. Furthermore, there are
strong statutory,62 constitutional63 and public policy 64 arrangements
militating against municipal antitrust liability. The Court's decision
58. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (the
"threshold inquiry" under Parker is "whether the activity is required by the State
acting as sovereign") (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1976) (state
commission's approval of utility tariff does not give rise to antitrust immunity where
no independent state regulatory interest in program existed).
60. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (rule prohib-
iting legal advertising exempt from federal antitrust laws when authorized by State
Supreme Court).
61. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415
(1978) (adequate state mandate for anticompetitive municipal activity exists when
"legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of").
62. The Court's decision fails to consider the possibility of substantial local inde-
pendence in states having constitutional or statutory provisions for home rule. See,
e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (home rule city may legislate on matters other than
municipal affairs, subject to general law). Home rule charters permit municipalities
to administer local matters without first seeking specific state authority. In home rule
jurisdictions, a requirement of state contemplation of local government action before
granting antitrust immunity may prove unworkable. See generally Vanlandingham,
Municoal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 280 (1968);
Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municoalities Exent from
Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1559 & n.7
(1977).
63. There is a constitutional underpinning to municipal claims of immunity from
antitrust liability. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the
Court determined the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1978), unconstitutionally interfered with the administration of essential
state and local government functions. 426 U.S. at 855. The Court held that Congress
may not interfere, through legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, with
the operation of integral state and local government functions absent a national emer-
gency. Id. at 852-53. Interference with the delivery of integral local government serv-
ices by application of the antitrust laws, therefore, may be unconstitutional. See
generally Comment, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League of Cities v. Usery,
57 B.U.L. REv. 178 (1977). See also Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F.
Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (NationalLeague ofCities is a "narrow excision from
the whole cloth" of Tenth Amendment).
64. Both dissenting opinions in Lafayette criticized the nonchalance with which
the Court treated the consequences of municipal exposure to potential treble dam-
ages. 435 U.S. at 440-43. The consequence to a municipality of a treble damage
award is potentially ruinous. In Lafayette, for example, the utilities alleged damages
against the cities in the amount of $180 million or $540 million after trebling. Peti-
tioner's Brief at 21.
Some courts have awarded damages against municipalities for violation of their
citizens' constitutional rights by city agents. See, e.g., Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d
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in Lafayette circumscribes the Parker doctrine once again, but the
difficult issue of federal-state-municipal relations remains un-
resolved.
Ross Benjamin Bricker
880, 881-82 (7th Cir. 1973) (actual and punitive damages and attorneys fees are re-
coverable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982-83).
The existence of tort damage awards against municipalities demonstrates that im-
position of antitrust liability would not be unprecedented. Jones v. State Highway
Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (State Supreme Court rejected rule of sovereign
tort immunity). Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978) (State
Supreme Court abrogated tort immunity of counties and other political subdivisions).
See generally Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J.
1483 (1977); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 919; Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipaltiesfor Constitutional Viola-
tions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976).
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol18/iss1/8
